



Consumer Ethics, Food Ethics, and Beyond

Mark Bryant Budolfson

.....

When is it wrong to buy something? Is it wrong whenever the product was produced unethically? What if your purchase doesn't make a difference to whether the unethical practice continues? What about purchasing and eating animal products specifically? And however we answer all those questions, how should we engage with people who act wrongly as consumers? In this essay, Mark Budolfson provides some tools for thinking more clearly about these questions, arguing that we need to be careful to separate our assessment of how things are produced from our assessment of consumers.

.....

The Coffee Shop on Thanksgiving

It's Thanksgiving morning, but you haven't yet gone home. You're still in your apartment by campus. As you get ready for the drive, it occurs to you that it would be great to grab some breakfast from your favorite coffee shop before you go. (Everything they sell is fantastic and reasonably priced.)

All the other good shops are closed on Thanksgiving. Fortunately for you, though, your favorite coffee shop is open. It's open because the

managers of the shop know that they can make a lot of money that day, as it's located in a high-traffic area. Unsurprisingly, the managers don't want to work in the coffee shop on Thanksgiving; they'd all prefer to be with their families. And so the managers themselves aren't working—they are forcing their employees to work, with the threat to cut their hours (or worse) if they don't agree take the shifts. What's worse, the managers aren't compensating their employees extra for working on Thanksgiving. They're doing what they've always done: paying their employees the smallest amount that's absolutely legally necessary. And suppose that the managers treat their workers with contempt, and thus have an obnoxious and wrong attitude toward them. In short, the employees who have to work on Thanksgiving are getting screwed, and are not being treated with proper respect by their bosses.

Is it unethical for you to purchase things from this shop on Thanksgiving, if we agree that the employees are being treated wrongly?¹

An Argument Against Purchasing: The Contribution Argument

One argument against going to the coffee shop is that on this particular day, Thanksgiving, the goods on sale at the coffee shop are being produced in an unethical way, and your purchasing those products would *contribute* to that unethical production. Therefore, your purchasing those products is ethically wrong. Let's call this the *Contribution Argument* against purchasing.

An Argument in Favor of Purchasing: The Inefficacy Argument

An argument on the other side, in favor of going to the coffee shop, is that the employees in the coffee shop are going to have to work on Thanksgiving regardless of whether you go there, so your purchases don't actually make any difference to the unethical production situation; your purchases also won't make any difference as to whether future employees have to work on future Thanksgivings: The managers' decision about whether to be open next year on Thanksgiving isn't going to be sensitive to the small amount you personally may or may not spend at the coffee shop today. Call this the *Inefficacy Premise*.² So, if you don't go to the coffee shop, you lose out and you don't help the employees, since your going or not going

to the coffee shop doesn't make any difference to the unethical situation that involves people having to work on Thanksgiving. As a result, it's ethically okay for you to go to the shop on Thanksgiving. Call this the *Inefficacy Argument* in favor of purchasing.

The Inefficacy Argument can be strengthened. If you give the employees at the coffee shop a decent tip, they will actually be *better off* if you decide to go to the coffee shop—which is perfectly consistent with their preferring not to be working on Thanksgiving at all. Indeed, because there is no limit on how much you can tip them, you could make them dramatically better off by being a customer on Thanksgiving. So, with this in mind, it could be argued that there must be *some* tip amount that would make it ethically okay to go to the coffee shop on Thanksgiving. However bad it is to contribute to an unethical situation, it's very good to make people much better off, especially when they're being screwed by unkind managers. Call this a *Helping in Other Ways Supplement* to the Inefficacy Argument.

Consumer Ethics: Generalizing the Discussion So Far

We've been considering a very specific ethical question about a very specific case—namely, whether it's wrong for you to go to the coffee shop on Thanksgiving. However, the arguments we've been exploring are applicable to more general debates in *consumer ethics*, which is the investigation of what it is and isn't okay to purchase (and why). When we do consumer ethics, we debate whether it's wrong to be a consumer of products that are produced in a way that's unethical, which arguably includes:

- sweatshop-produced clothing and other goods,
 - blood diamonds and other conflict minerals,
 - NCAA sports,
 - fossil fuels,
 - factory farmed animal products,
- and so on.

The point of this paper is to put you in a good position to understand the arguments for and against the ethical permissibility of consuming these and other goods, based on the arguments considered above and below regarding the coffee shop on Thanksgiving.

Based on the considerations listed above and below, different people will reach different conclusions about the permissibility of

consuming different products based on arguments similar to those considered in this paper. The arguments and objections to those arguments are structurally similar to those considered here. For example, the idea behind the Contribution Argument is that if something is produced in a way that is wrong, then it is then wrong to be a consumer of it, because being a consumer contributes to the wrongful things involved in its production. The Inefficacy Premise illustrates an important kind of objection to this argument, because the Inefficacy Premise claims that even though a good is produced in a way that is wrong, being a consumer need not contribute to the wrongful things involved in its production.

Objections to the Inefficacy Argument: Expressive Value, Complicity in Wrongdoing, and Other Factors

There are several ways someone might try to criticize the Inefficacy Argument. For instance, even if the Inefficacy Premise is true, there are still a number of further premises that could be used to argue that it's wrong to go into the coffee shop and make purchases on Thanksgiving. For example, it could be argued that the following things are true:

- An individual who purchases things at the coffee shop on Thanksgiving still *expresses support* for the unethical production situation, even if the Inefficacy Premise is true.³
- An individual who purchases things at the coffee shop on Thanksgiving *cooperates with the wrongful plans of the coffee shop managers*. So, there is a sense in which your purchases make you *complicit* in the unethical production situation, even if the Inefficacy Premise is true.⁴
- An individual who purchases things at the coffee shop on Thanksgiving *benefits from wrongdoing*, even if the Inefficacy Premise is true.
- If everyone refused to go into the coffee shop on Thanksgiving, the coffee shop wouldn't be open on Thanksgiving next year, and so then people next year wouldn't be forced to work on Thanksgiving. So, because *we collectively* could make a difference, it's wrong for *you individually* to go to the coffee shop on Thanksgiving. Call this the *What If Everyone Did That? Argument*, which is consistent with the truth of the Inefficacy Premise.⁵

- Individual instances of people purchasing things at the coffee shop on Thanksgivings are part of *the causal explanation* of the coffee shop being open on Thanksgiving. So, there is still a *causal connection* between your purchases and the unethical production situation, even if the Inefficacy Premise is true.⁶

Someone could use one or more of these premises to argue that even if the Inefficacy Premise is true, it is nonetheless unethical for you to consume things from the coffee shop on Thanksgiving. For example, using the second premise above about complicity, it could be argued that the goods on sale at the coffee shop are being produced in an unethical way, and your purchasing those products would make you complicit with that unethical production in a way that's itself ethically wrong. Therefore, purchasing those products is itself ethically wrong. Call this the *Complicity Argument* against purchasing.⁷

A different kind of objection to the Inefficacy Argument would be to argue that the Inefficacy Premise itself is false, contrary to what the Inefficacy Argument assumes. For example, it could be argued that an individual consumer really does make a difference with his or her purchases, or at least has a small chance of making a big difference with each individual purchase in a way that vindicates the Contribution Argument.⁸

Objections to Arguments Against Purchasing Based on Expressing Support, Complicity, Etc.

All that said, there are good replies to the objections mentioned in the last section, so it's not at all clear that it's wrong to buy goods at the coffee shop on Thanksgiving. For instance:

- It's false that being a consumer of a good automatically expresses support for everything involved in the production of that good. For example, in the coffee shop on Thanksgiving case, suppose you watch someone else walk into the coffee shop, order two shots of Fireball and a donut, give the barista a \$20 tip, and shout at the top of their lungs, "Fuck the bastards that make you work on Thanksgiving!" (In response to recent trends in consumer demand, this coffee shop serves adult beverages too.) We might have various concerns about this person's behavior, but among them is not that they are expressing support for the unethical production situation in which people are made to work on Thanksgiving. This shows

that it is false that consuming a good means that you automatically express support for every aspect of the production of that good.⁹

- Arguments based on complicity, expressing support for wrongdoing, and other such factors seem to overgeneralize and imply that it is wrong to consume everything, which is absurd. For example, even unobjectionable things like breakfast cereal are arguably produced in a way that's wrong, given the unethical energy and fuel infrastructure that is necessary to produce and transport everything, and given the unsustainable sourcing of materials in almost every such product. If the factors above were really wrong-making factors, they would imply that it is wrong to consume nearly everything, since nearly everything is produced in a way that is wrong.¹⁰
- It isn't always wrong to benefit from wrongdoing. For example, if I meet my beloved partner only because a terrorist attack causes us to meet (when otherwise we would never have met), I benefit from wrongdoing, but that doesn't mean that it's wrong for me to be with my partner.¹¹ Furthermore, even setting that aside, by giving a large enough tip I can erase any unjust benefit that I receive, because I can then cause myself to pay an ethically fair price for the goods I consume. This illustrates how a Helping in Other Ways Supplement can often neutralize the force of ethical objections to many individual decisions.
- The What If Everyone Did That? Argument is a confused argument as it stands. For example, it would be a total disaster if everyone became a doctor, because then no one would have any skills other than doctoring. Society would break down! But that doesn't mean there is anything wrong with an individual person becoming a doctor. So, the argument must be confused as it stands.¹²
- It isn't always wrong for your actions to be part of the causal explanation of wrongful harm to others. For example, there's a causal connection between your use of electricity right now and increased climate change and air pollution, both of which kill people. That doesn't mean it's wrong for you to consume electricity right now. Part of the explanation is that it isn't *inherently* wrong to consume electricity, and instead the problem arises because of a *collective action problem*—in particular, only as the result of the collective actions of many people in a poorly regulated situation—and you are not responsible as an individual

person for the poor regulations or for the collective action problem. Furthermore, individuals like you voting with their dollars isn't a realistic way of solving the collective action problem. And your unilateral actions won't make a difference to the problem, as in the Inefficacy Premise above. When all those conditions are present, your behavior is not the ethically fundamental cause of any harm, and so being causally connected to harm in such a situation isn't wrong.¹³

Nevertheless, it could be argued that it's *sometimes* wrong to consume a good even when it doesn't make any difference to the harm suffered by anyone—for example, it's wrong to watch child pornography even if it is freely downloaded online and doesn't make any difference to anything that happens outside the viewer's home. It seems plausible that such acts are inherently wrong. So, the Inefficacy Argument isn't decisive on its own: we need to consider whether there are other potential wrong-making factors. But it's also plausible that there are no other wrong-making factors in the coffee shop on Thanksgiving case, and given the facts about collective action and the inefficacy of individual action in that case, it's okay for you to purchase goods at the coffee shop on Thanksgiving—especially if you leave a decent tip. Call this the *Collective Action and Other Factors Argument* in favor of purchasing.

Your Dinner Tonight

Hopefully, you'll have dinner tonight, and hopefully, you'll have some choices about what to eat. One of the choices will be about whether to eat animal products. Is it wrong for you to consume meat, dairy, or eggs as part of your dinner?

To answer this question, we need to know whether the animal products available to you are produced in a way that's unethical. There are many other papers you can read about how to think about this question. And this question is complicated, because at different dinners you'll have to choose between different animal products that are all produced in different ways, presumably on a spectrum from worse to better as to how the animals were treated and other ethically relevant factors. I assume that you'll read a lot elsewhere and think more about this issue, as it's very important. But it isn't the focus of this paper.

That's because, as we've seen above, it doesn't immediately follow that it is wrong for you to eat animal products even if we assume that they

are produced in a way that's unethical—just as it doesn't immediately follow that it's wrong to purchase goods at the coffee shop on Thanksgiving, even if we assume that the goods in the shop are all produced in a way that's unethical on that day.

Is the Inefficacy Argument plausible when it comes to the consumption of animal products? This is, in part, an empirical question. It's worth remembering, however, that many products we consume are delivered by a massive and complex supply chain in which there is some *reliable* amount of *slack*—in the form of waste, inefficiency, and so on—at many links in that chain. That slack serves as a buffer to absorb any would-be effects from the links before, which means that production decisions are insensitive to the signal generated by a single consumer's purchase.

Consider, for instance, the supply chain for American beef. When ranchers who own their own grazing land decide how many cattle to raise, their decisions are sensitive to their own financial situation, the number of cattle their land can support, the expected price of any additional feed that will be needed, the expected price of bull semen and other “raw materials” that go into cattle production, and the expected price that the cattle will fetch when they are ultimately sold to feedlots. Of these, small changes in the last item—the price that cattle will fetch at the feedlot—are of the least importance, because insofar as ranchers judge that capital should be invested in raising cattle rather than other investments, they'll tend to raise as many cattle as they can afford to breed and feed within that budget, letting the ultimate extent of their profits fall where it may at the feedlot. Many ranchers also use the nutritional well-being of their herd as a buffer to absorb adverse changes in market conditions, feeding their cattle less and less to whatever point maximizes the new expectation of profits as adverse conditions develop, or even sending the entire herd to premature slaughter if, say, feed prices rise to levels that are unacceptably high. This serves to shift the ranchers' emphasis in decision-making relevant to herd size even further away from the price of beef. As a result, even if an individual's consumption decisions managed to have a \$0.01 effect on the price of cattle at feedlots—which isn't likely—it isn't clear that there would be any appreciable effect on the number of cattle produced.

More importantly, because animal production is so many links in the supply chain away from grocery stores and restaurants, and because the intervening links typically involve some small but non-negligible amount of waste, inefficiency, and other forms of slack that serve as a buffer to absorb any effect that your personal consumption might

otherwise have. These facts suggest that there is good empirical reason to think that the expected impact of a single individual's consumption decisions on production is nearly zero. A similar upshot emerges even in a more vertically integrated industry such as the poultry industry, where demand is relatively inelastic, and profits are dependent mostly on the cost of inputs such as feed and fuel.

All that said, there are important differences between, on the one hand, eating some ground beef, and on the other hand, going to the coffee shop on Thanksgiving. For instance, someone might think that it is inherently wrong to consume animal products, perhaps because it's inherently disrespectful to view animals as food. Alternately, someone might think that an ethically relevant difference is that we can't directly benefit the animals who were harmed to produce our food in the way we can benefit coffee shop employees—there's no way to tip the animals our plates. At best, we can invest resources in helping *other* animals. Until we settle these and related issues, it's an open question whether these differences show that the Inefficacy Argument fails when it comes to animal products.

What to Do about Wrongdoing by Others

We've been focused on what it's permissible for you to do as a consumer. A different issue concerns what you should do in response to unethical consumer behavior by others. After all, even if we assume that it's unethical to be a consumer of a particular product, there remains a question about how to respond to other people consuming that product. That's the subject of this final section.

It may be useful to take a step back for a moment. Before people think carefully about the issues discussed in this paper, some of them may be apt to say that "there's no fact of the matter" about these issues because they are "all relative," because "what's true for you might not be true for me," "we should live and let live," and so on. It's important to see that, although such thoughts are natural and widespread, they are incorrect.

To see why, imagine the following. I bring a cute pet pig into your class, which I allow all of your interested classmates to pet, take selfies with, and generally get friendly with. The pig is popular because he's cuddly and has a great personality—which is no surprise, as his cognitive abilities are far superior to dogs and other companion animals. But then my behavior turns ugly. It turns out that I am a psychopathic philosophy

professor, and I've only brought the pig to class to teach you a brutal lesson about ethics. To teach you the lesson, I take out a hammer and large nails, and I begin pounding nails into the back of the pig, which begins squealing in wild terror and agony.

What do you think would happen if I actually did this to a pig in front of your class? I predict—and I hope—that several students (maybe you!) would immediately tackle me, or throw chairs at me, or do whatever was necessary to prevent me from continuing to brutally harm the innocent pig. When you reflect on this, don't you agree that it isn't a mere matter of opinion that it's wrong to pound nails into a pig? After all, if it were *merely a matter of opinion*, then it wouldn't be okay to physically intervene, tackle me, and restrain me. But it's definitely okay to do all of those things, and in fact *required*. You *ought* to restrain me if you can. And if one of your classmates tried to stand in between us in order to (as we can imagine him saying) "protect my right" to continue torturing the pig, you should throw him out of the way as well.

To explain why it's permissible for you to physically intervene to prevent me from harming the pig, we must assume that it's objectively true that it's wrong for me to harm the pig in that way. If it weren't objectively true, then it couldn't be okay to physically prevent me from doing it; but if it is objectively true, then it could very well be okay to intervene to prevent me from harming the pig, just as it would be okay to intervene to prevent me from seriously assaulting one of your fellow classmates. As this example illustrates, it just isn't plausible to maintain that there's no objective fact of the matter about what it's right and wrong to do, and to prevent others from doing, in a wide range of cases.

But from the fact that something is objectively wrong, it doesn't immediately follow that it's okay to intervene. Being objectively wrong appears to be a *necessary* condition for it being okay to intervene, but it isn't *sufficient*. For example, if you have a guest lecturer in one of your courses who merely uses an example or two that are not-thoughtful-to-the-feelings-of-others-but-also-not-outrageously-bad, it isn't okay for one of your classmates to physically intervene to prevent this guest lecturer from continuing to speak. The upshot is that in order for it to be okay to intervene to prevent wrongdoing by others, it's necessary not only that (i) what the others are doing is objectively wrong, but also (ii) that what the others are doing is *sufficiently wrong or dangerous to justify an intervention*. In the unthoughtful guest lecturer case, (i) may be true; however, (ii) isn't, so it isn't okay to intervene to prevent the guest lecturer from talking.

In light of all this, what is it right and wrong for you to do in response to unethical consumer behavior by others? Again, even if we assume that it is unethical to consume meat, it's a further question how you should respond when other people plan to consume it. Should you intervene to stop them? Tell them they are bad people and wrongdoers if they consume the product? Or not say anything too direct, but try to draw their attention to some of the reasons why it's wrong, hoping that they figure it out for themselves?

For example, suppose you have dinner tonight with your friends, and some of them plan to eat meat, and we assume that it's wrong to eat meat. Would it be okay to physically stop them from eating meat, or at least shame them, or perhaps even throw red paint on them while they scoop meat onto their plate at the dining hall, in order to teach them how importantly wrong their behavior is? Most people think none of these dramatic actions would be okay even if it's wrong to eat meat.¹⁴ At the same time, most people would agree that it is okay to intervene to prevent me from harming the pig in the example above. What explains this difference?

Here's one possibility. Many of the arguments that it's wrong to eat meat were consistent with the Inefficacy Premise. So, even if it's wrong to eat meat, that may be consistent with it not making any difference whether a single individual eats meat, which could explain why condition (ii) may not be satisfied when your friend is about to eat meat at the dining hall, even though (ii) would be satisfied if I were about to pound more nails into a pig in front of your class.

If this is right, then it suggests a general lesson about how we should respond to the unethical choices that people make in other domains. When people's wrongful actions would make a difference to the harm suffered by others, then it may (*may*) be okay to intervene in various ways—for instance, by calling them out publicly, shaming them, or finding other ways to deter them from injuring others. But when people are acting in contexts where their choices make no difference to whether individuals are harmed, there's a real risk that intervening is merely a way of being obnoxious and counterproductive, rather than being a courageous defender of justice. In those cases, it may be best to be friendly to wrongdoers, building credibility with them, partly in hopes that they'll be more likely to listen to arguments for changing their behavior.¹⁵

Comprehension Questions

1. What's the Contribution Argument? What's the Inefficacy Argument? What's the Helping in Other Ways Supplement?
2. What are some of the objections to the Inefficacy Argument?
3. How does Budolfson respond to the idea that being a consumer of a good automatically expresses support for everything involved in the production of that good?
4. Why does Budolfson think that a version of the Inefficacy Argument is plausible in the case of eating animal products?
5. What is Budolfson's argument against the view that everything is relative when it comes to moral questions?

Discussion Questions

1. What do you think about Budolfson's coffee shop case? Is it morally okay to go to the shop on the morning of Thanksgiving? What are the differences between that case and the case of eating animal products? Are those differences morally significant?
2. When are you supporting unethical practices? Whenever you buy a product that was produced unethically? If so, what do you make of the argument that Budolfson gives against this view? And if purchasing isn't enough to count as supporting unethical practices, what *does* count?
3. What's your take on Budolfson's "anti-cancel-culture" conclusion to his essay? Some people might respond: "Look, it's easy to *underestimate* how often people make a difference. So, we should intervene—not necessarily physically, but somehow—more often to discourage people from acting wrongly." Is this a good objection to his view? Why or why not?

Case Study

At the end of an essay on the ethics of eating animals, Grace Boey writes this:

[Why] did I stop eating most animals? . . . [What] gave me the final push was really this: I just felt *sad* every time I looked down at my plate. The reason why I started feeling so sad was because [I had been] meticulously poring through animal rights books and academic papers for months; so much of this information had seeped into my brain that I

could no longer live with eating the stuff I knew to be produced in this way. That's why giving up meat was so easy for me: where I used to see a pork chop on a plate, I now see a tail-less, crusty-eyed, psychotic sow. And it's important to me that I keep this aversion going: I have no wish to remain in a system I don't believe in, even if it should make no utilitarian impact.

For me, this is what animal abstinence in a broken system boils down to: integrity. Emotion and some cognition may have been the spark, but the desire for integrity is what really keeps this flame going. And this is why I keep pictures of battery cages in my phone, even though I don't spontaneously visualize miserable hens when peeking into patisseries. When I opt out, I act in accordance with my own values about how the world should be—which is, free of the system. Whether or not the 'virtue' of such integrity makes for a strict moral requirement, it's certainly important to my own project of self-integration and identity that I pursue it.

Abstinence from the system is a legitimate and desirable reflection of my own values, and it is largely for *this* reason that I would encourage others to join me. It's none of my business if they don't, but I'm happy for those who do: I think it helps them achieve a more cohesive identity, helps them live better with themselves, and helps them break out of their indifference in general to animal welfare. For me, abstinence is something that keeps me motivated towards my goal of being in a position to influence this cause in a substantial way. Perhaps there's nothing theoretically incoherent about someone who lobbies against the system, while continuing to eat factory-farmed meat. Good for anyone who can do that, I suppose. But I can't, and I suspect the same is true of most others. In reality, continuing to participate in a system we disapprove of in our heads tends to push it further towards the back of our minds.¹⁶

What do you make of this response to the Inefficacy Argument? What might Budolfson say in reply? Which position do you find most plausible? Why?

Endnotes

1. There may be some controversy over whether it's really ethically wrong for a coffee shop to treat its employees in such a way, but we'll bracket that controversy here and assume for the sake of a simple example that it is wrong for the employees to be treated in this way. We can then investigate the specific question we are most interested in here, which is whether it follows from this assumption that it is wrong for individual people like you and me to purchase the goods that the employees produce.

2. Notice that this might be put forward as an objection to the second premise of the Contribution Argument, since the second premise of that argument is that “your purchasing those products would contribute to that unethical production in a way that’s itself ethically wrong.” Arguably, that’s false if your purchasing those products wouldn’t make any difference to the unethical production.
3. Tyler Doggett discusses this kind of factor in an unpublished paper titled “Consumption”.
4. Tristram McPherson discusses this kind of factor in “How to Argue for (and against) Ethical Veganism”, in Barnhill, Budolfson, and Doggett, 2016, *Food, Ethics, and Society*, Oxford UP.
5. Derek Parfit discusses this kind of factor in “What if everyone did that?”, in Derek Parfit, 2011, *On What Matters: Volume One*, Oxford UP.
6. Alvin Goldman discusses this kind of factor in Alvin Goldman, 1999, “Why Citizens Should Vote: A Causal Responsibility Approach”, *Social Philosophy and Policy* 16: 201–217.
7. Notice how The Complicity Argument has a different second premise than The Contribution Argument, where the second premise of The Complicity Argument is not threatened by The Inefficacy Premise, unlike the second premise of The Contribution Argument.
8. For an objection to the Inefficacy Premise that is often endorsed by act consequentialist philosophers, see Alastair Norcross, 2004, “Puppies, Pigs, and People”, *Philosophical Perspectives* 18: 229–245, esp. pp. 233.
9. This is an objection to the arguments in Tyler Doggett, “Consumption”; another objection is the overgeneralization objection that follows. As Julia Nefsky and Jason Brennan and Peter Jaworski observe, it is implausible to assume that there is a single thing expressed by every consumer action of a particular type that is insensitive to individual intentions and other communicative decisions—and this implausible assumption seems to motivate arguments based on expressing support. (See Julia Nefsky, 2018, “Consumer Choice and Collective Impact”, in Barnhill, Budolfson, and Doggett eds., *Oxford Handbook of Food Ethics*, Oxford UP, and Jason Brennan and Peter Jaworski, 2015, *Markets Without Limits*, Routledge.)
10. For this kind of overgeneralization objection to all of these factors, see Mark Budolfson, “Is it Wrong to Eat Meat from Factory Farms? If So, Why?”, in Bramble and Fischer eds., 2015, *The Moral Complexities of Eating Meat*, Oxford UP, pp. 92–94. As another example, assuming NCAA basketball is produced in a way that is wrong (because of the exploitation of unpaid labor, etc.), the complicity idea seems to imply that it is wrong to watch NCAA basketball on TV at a bar, even if you know it won’t make any difference whether or not you as one additional individual watch the game. For further discussion, see also Mark Budolfson, unpublished, “The Inefficacy Objection to Deontology: What it is, Why it is Important, and How to Respond to It”.

11. Christian Barry and David Wiens, 2016, “Benefiting from Wrongdoing and Sustaining Wrongful Harm”, *Journal of Moral Philosophy* 13: 530–552.
12. For this kind of objection, see Derek Parfit, 2011, *On What Matters: Volume One*, Oxford UP, pp. 309.
13. Mark Budolfson discusses this kind of argument in an unpublished paper “Collective Action, Climate Change, and the Ethical Significance of Futility”.
14. For discussion of this ‘puzzle of accommodation’, see Elizabeth Harman, “Eating Meat as a Morally Permissible Moral Mistake”, in Chignell, Cuneo, and Halteman eds., 2015, *Philosophy Comes to Dinner*, Routledge.
15. For further discussion of related ideas, see Max Bazerman, 2020, *Better, Not Perfect: A Realist’s Guide to Maximum Sustainable Goodness*, Harper Business. See also “Barack Obama challenges ‘woke’ culture”, BBC News, 30 October 2019.
16. From *Food, Ethics, and Society*, edited by A. Barnhill, M. Budolfson, and T. Doggett (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).